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Originally posted by soul at 22-4-2006 18:09
boleh kasik info pulak saper Bismarck masa WW1 ? biodata ker ?
Ehmmm Bismarck ( nama penuh Prinz Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck-Schonhausen) dah mati masa WW1! Beliau merupakan antara negarawan terulung di Eropah dalam kurun ke-19. Menjadi Minister-President Prussia dari tahun 1862-1890. Beliau merupakan tunjang utama proses penyatuan Jerman pada tahun 1871. beliau turut menjadi Chancellor Konfederasi Utara Jerman dari 1867, jawatan yang dikembangkan kepada Chancellor Empayar Jerman apabila Jerman bersatu dalam tahun 1871. jawatan ini beliau pegang sehingga 1890 apabila beliau meletak jawatan atas desakan Kaiser William II. Beliau meninggal dunia pada tahun 1898.
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Born of an old Brandenburg Junker family, he studied at Göttingen and Berlin, and after holding minor judicial and administrative offices he was elected (1847) to the Prussian Landtag [parliament]. There he opposed the liberal movement, advocated unification of Germany under the aegis of Prussia, and defended the privileges of his elite social class, the Junkers. As Prussian minister to the German diet at Frankfurt (1851 |
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jarang dapat tengok gambar Battleship DKM Bismarck dalam gambar berwarna
god Job HangPC2  |
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Gambar warna memang rare, terutama pada awal perang. Sebab mahal! |
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takder ker filem perang pasal kapal ni? |
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Originally posted by pisang69 at 29-3-2007 01:21 PM
takder ker filem perang pasal kapal ni?
Ada ... tapi citer klasik ler
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The Construction and Sea Trials
Photo: The birthday of Bismarck 1 July 1936.
The building contract was placed on 16 November 1935 with the Blohm & Voss, Hamburg, as New Construction "F" later named Bismarck and the keel was laid on 1 July 1936.
Photo: The launching ceremony on 14 February 1939.
She spent 30 months on the ways before she was launched on 14 February 1939 by Frau Dorothea von Loewenfeld, the granddaughter of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. At 1334 the hull of Bismarck slowly glided into the water.
Photo: Captain Ernst Lindemann inspects the honor guard at 24 August 1940. The day Bismarck was commisioned.
The Bismarck was commissioned 18 months later on 24 August 1940 and placed under the command of Kapit鋘 zur See (Captain) Ernst Lindemann.
Photo: 15 September 1940 the Bismarck leaves the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg for the first time. She's heading for the Baltic Sea for sea trials and battle exercise.
The Bismarck left the wharf at Blohm & Voss in Hamburg on 15 September 1940 for the first time and underwent her sea trials and battle practice in the Baltic Sea. The mighty ship was going down the channel of Elbe. From the Elbe the Bismarck entered the Kiel Canal and headed towards Kiel and the Baltic Sea.
Photo: 8 December 1940, the Bismarck returns up the Elbe to complete her yardwork at Blohm & Voss in Hamburg.
At the end of her trials, the ship was scheduled to return to Blohm & Voss in Hamburg so that the yard could give her the "finishing touches" it had not been able to complete by September. On 9 December 1940 the Bismarck was back in Hamburg.
On 24 January 1941, the finishing touches to the ship were completed but the Bismarck could not immediately return to the Baltic Sea to continue her sea trials and battle practice as it was intended to do. A sunken ore ship was blocking the Kiel Canal, and the thick ice that had formed during this exceptionally severe winter was delaying salvage work. The idea of making the long detour around Jutland (Denmark), was rejected by Berlin.
Photo: Bismarck during trials together with Prinz Eugen in March 1941.
The Bismarck remained at anchor in Hamburg until 6 March 1941. The Bismarck cast off from the wharf at the Blohm & Voss yard heading for Kiel via the Elbe and Kiel Canal. On 8 March 1941 the Bismarck reached Kiel. The sea trials and battle practice could continue.
Photo: From the surprise visit made of Hitler to inspect Bismarck (and Tirpitz) on 5 May 1941.
Admiral G黱ther L黷jens was placed in charge of Operation "Rhein黚ung" ("Exercise Rhine"). He took command of the task force in April 1941, just in time to receive the F黨rer. Adolf Hitler made a surprise visit to Gotenhafen on 5 May to inspect the Bismarck and Tirpitz (which had recently arrived to conduct her sea trials in the Baltic) and be briefed on L黷jens' plans for executing the forthcoming sortie although the actual date was kept vague. Raeder and L黷jens feared Hitler would veto the plan and keep Bismarck in German waters until at least Tirpitz was ready. Raeder did not attent the visit, to avoid questions).
Photo: By early May 1941, the Bismarck was ready for combat operations.
On Friday 16 May 1941, Admiral L黷jens advised the German Naval High Command that his task force was ready for operational deployment, and he was given the "green light" to proceed.
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Operation "Rhein黚ung" (Part One)
The purpose of the Operation "Rhein黚ung" ("Exercise Rhine") was to conduct warfare, in the North Atlantic for a period of several months, against the allied convoys from USA and Great Britain. The objective was to destroy as much enemy tonnage as possible.
Originally it was planned to use Germany's newest, and the worlds largest, battleship (Bismarck) and two other German battleships, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, for the operation
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had, between 22 January and 22 March 1941, conducted a successful operation called "Berlin" in the North Atlantic. Within 2 months they had sunk 22 allied ships totalling 115,622 brt. The man in charge of this successful operation was Admiral G黱ther L黷jens.
Admiral G黱ther L黷jens was chosen to lead Operation "Rhein黚ung" as well.
However it was not possible to use Scharnhorst and Gneisenau due to damage caused by British air attacks and mechanical failure. At this time they were both stationed in Brest, France. Instead the Germans decided that their newest heavy cruiser, Prinz Eugen, should sail together with Bismarck during Operation "Rhein黚ung".
On Sunday 18 May 1941, Admiral L黷jens briefed the officers of the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen on his intentions. The Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were to proceed independently to the island of R黦en, where the task force would be formed on the morning of 19 May 1941.
Towards midday on Sunday 18 May, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed out of the harbour of Gotenhafen. Just outside the harbour the ships dropped their anchors to refuel and take on additional provisions. The Operation "Rhein黚ung" ("Exercise Rhine") had begun. They finally got underway in the early morning hours of Monday 19 May (the Bismarck sailed at 0200). The ships first circled around the Hel Peninsula, a thin finger of land jutting down from the Baltic coast, and then headed westward.
Photo: Bismarck in the wake of a minesweeper shortly after the beginning of Operation "Rhein黚ung".
The battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were escorted by the destroyers Z-23 and Z-16 (Friedrich Eckoldt) and preceded by a minesweeper. The task force sailed as a unit after leaving R黦en. Around 2230, the destroyer Z-10 (Hans Lody) joined the formation. By nightfall the task force, reached the western end of the Baltic Sea and turned north to pass through the Great Belt (Denmark). On the following morning of Tuesday 20 May, the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen had reached the Kattegat.
 
Photos: Photographs taken from Prinz Eugen on her the way to Norway. On the left photograph Prinz Eugen can be seen in the wake of a mine destructor ship and in front of this, the battleship Bismarck. On the right photograph the three escorting destroyers can be seen in the wake of the Prinz Eugen.
On 20 May around 1300, the German task force were sighted by the Swedish aircraft-carrying cruiser Gotland who immediately reported the passage of the Germans.
Before the report from the Gotland the British had been informed of the German operation gained by an aerial reconnaissance, during which five picket vessels had been sighted about 1200 around twenty nautical miles west of Vinga, followed about ten nautical miles astern by a task force described as three Leberecht Mass-class destroyers plus a cruiser and a very large warship. At this point it was not confirmed to the British that Bismarck was participating in this operation.
After clearing the northern tip of Denmark, the German task force headed west through the Skagerak towards Norway. Admiral L黷jens intended to continue to the north. But due to the clear weather he dicided to anchor in Norway and wait some hours in order to continue the journey at night protected by the darkness.
Around 1600 on 20 May, the task force were escorted through their own minefields by the 5th Minesweeping Flotilla.
When the formation left the minefield, the minesweepers were detached and the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, still escorted by destroyers, steered a zigzag course at 17 knots to avoid submarines.
Following the line of the coast, they turned westward. They would resume their northerly course after they had rounded the southwestern tip of Norway. Between 2100 and 2200 they passed through the southernmost channel in the Kristiansand minefield, then proceeded at a speed of 27 knots.
The German task force was sighted by several Norwegian resistance members. They reported that "two unidentified major ships, escorted by several smaller ones" had passed by the coast.
Photo: Aerial photograph of Bismarck on her way to Norway.
Photo: Bismarck (left) anchores in Grimstadfjord while Prinz Eugen (right) sails farther north to anchor in Kalvanes Bay together with the destroyers.
Early the next morning Wednesday 21 May the Bismarck went to general quarters. Not long thereafter, they reached the entrance to Korsfjord. The Bismarck went into Grimstadfjord, south of Bergen, and anchored at the entrance to Fj鰎angerfjord, about 500 meters (455 yards) from shore. The Prinz Eugen and the destroyers went farther north, to Kalvanes.
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Operation "Rhein黚ung" (Part Two)
Photo: Bismarck anchored in Grimstadfjord in Norway.
While at their anchorages, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were repainted. Both took on additional supplies, and the Prinz Eugen topped up her fuel tanks, but the Bismarck did not. For some unknown reason, L黷jens and Lindemann decided not to top up the Bismarck's fuel tanks while she was lying in Grimstadfjord. Bismarck had used a significant amount of fuel sailing from Gotenhafen to Norway, and it would have been prudent to refuel at that time, as was done for the Prinz Eugen. The only opportunity that remained for refuelling the Bismarck before she entered the Denmark Strait was by the german tanker Weissenburg, which was stationed in the Norwegian Sea above the Arctic Circle and was not too far off their intended course.
The information that L黷jens received from the German intelligence showed that as far as was known, all units of the Home Fleet were still at their base at Scapa Flow. The British Home Fleet appeared to be no serious threat to the breakout for the German task force along the more northerly routes that L黷jens could take.
The German task force could choose between four different routes into the North Atlantic. The passage between the Orkney Islands and the Shetland Islands, and the passage between the Shetland Islands and the Danish Faeroe Islands was rejected because of the short distance to the British RAF airbases in northern Scotland and the naval base at Scapa Flow. The only truly viable alternatives were either the passage between the Faroe Islands and Iceland or the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland. L黷jens was not convinced of the safety of using the passage between the Faroe Islands and Iceland since his ships had been spotted by the Swedish cruiser Gotland and by Danish and Swedish fishing boats in the Kattegat. L黷jens decided to take the long way around through the Denmark Strait even though he was aware of the dangers of that route. Because of the pack ice surrounding Greenland, the passage between Iceland and Greenland was quite narrow. He also knew of the minefield that had been laid off the north-western coast of Iceland, but in the end, as the operational commander, the decision was up to him.
It was now very important for the British to locate the two German ships and to keep track of their movements. The Royal Air Force was requested to undertake reconnaissance missions along the coast of Norway in an attempt to locate and positively identify the reported German warships. On the morning of 21 May, RAF photographic-reconnaissance Spitfires took off from northern Scotland to scout the lower portion of the Norwegian coastline, especially its fjord systems which could easily hide the ships.
Photo: Bismarck photographed in Grimstadfjord by a British photographic-reconnaissance Spitfire.
Shortly after noon on 21 May, one of the Spitfires (Flying Officer Michael Suckling) flew at high altitude over the fjord system in the area of Bergen, Norway and routinely photographed all of the possible anchorages in sight. One photograph taken over Grimstadfjord showed a large ship surrounded by several much smaller ones. The size of the ship and a measurement of its beam-to-length ratio was indicative of a modern battleship. The British was certain that the Bismarck had been found.
After the discovery of the Bismarck in Grimstadfjord, RAF Bomber Command was immediately ordered to attack her anchorage.
Photo: At 1930, 21 May Bismarck weighed anchor and headed north to join the Prinz Eugen and the three destroyers in Kalvanes Bay.
At 1930, 21 May the Bismarck weighed anchor and headed north to join the Prinz Eugen and the destroyers outside Kalvanes. The formation continued on its way. Later that evening, the weather got worse and the sky became completely overcast. At about 2300 they turned away from the rocky shoreline, the destroyers in the lead, followed by the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen.
During the night of 21 May the area, where Bismarck were sighted, was heavily bombed by the British, but due to poor visibility, the planes returned without being able to report the results of their raid. The next day, an RAF Coastal Command reconnaissance plane scouted the area and found the anchorages to be empty. At this time it was more than 24 hours since the RAF photographic-reconnaissance Spitfire (Flying Officer Michael Suckling) had photographed the German task force at Bergen, and they could have sailed over 600 miles in that time.
According to plan, around 0500 on Thursday 22 May, L黷jens released the destroyers that had shielded the formation from British submarines. The task force were in the latitude of Trondheim. From now on, the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen were alone, and the squadron continued northwards at 24 knots. L黷jens was still uncertain whether to go north or south of Iceland.
Steaming at 24 knots in hazy weather under an overcast sky, the task force reached a position approximately 200 nautical miles from the Norwegian coast, in the latitude Iceland-Norway, at about noon 22 May. Weather conditions, which seemed settled, were just what L黷jens hoped to encounter when he attempted to break out into the Atlantic through the northern passage. At noon, L黷jens advised the Prinz Eugen that he intended to go direct for the Denmark Strait but not to oil from Weissenburg (German tanker) unless the weather lifted. A fatal decision that would have consequences later for the Bismarck and her crew. What may have finally decided L黷jens to stick to the originally plan was the continuing poor visibility which meteorologists predicted would last to southern Greenland. The squadron altered from due north to north-west.
Photo: Bismarck in front of Prinz Eugen in the North Atlantic.
At 1237 22 May, the Bismarck sounded her submarine and aircraft alarms - a periscope sighting had been reported. The task force turned to port and steered a zigzag course for half an hour, but nothing transpired and at 1307 it resumed its former course. Due to poor weather and and thick fog the Bismarck shone her big searchlights astern to help the Prinz Eugen keep position. They were now in the northern latitudes, where the nights are almost as light as the days, so they could stay in a tight formation and maintain 24 knots even in poor visibility.
The British was now well aware that Bismarck was on her way trying to break out into the North Atlantic. Admiral Tovey ordered Hood and Prince of Wales to take station south of Iceland. There they would be in a position to cover the Denmark Strait passage or turn east to back up the forces covering the Faeroes-Iceland passage should the Bismarck appear in that area. The Suffolk was ordered to join the Norfolk, in the Denmark Strait. The light cruisers Arethusa, Birmingham and Manchester were directed to resume their patrol of the Faeroes-Iceland passage after refuelling at their bases in Iceland.
Admiral Tovey then formed his second task force from the remainder of the Home Fleet that was still at Scapa Flow. This included the battleship King George V, aircraft carrier Victorious, light cruisers Aurora, Galatea, Hermione, Kenya, and Neptune, and six destroyers. Admiral Tovey's force left port some time before midnight on 22 May. The Repulse, about to embark on convoy duty, was recalled from the Firth of Clyde near Glasgow and ordered to join Admiral Tovey's force at sea north-west of Scotland. There the task force would lie in wait behind the light cruiser screen, ready to pounce on the Bismarck should she attempt the Iceland-Faeroes passage, or be prepared to turn westward and support the Hood-Prince of Wales task force should the Germans come through the Denmark Strait.
At 2322 L黷jens ordered a course change to the west: a course toward the Denmark Strait.
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The First Contact
Early in the morning of 23 May the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen entered the Denmark Strait. By the late afternoon of 23 May, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were approaching the pack ice off the coast of Greenland. From there, they turned on a southerly course. The German squadron proceeded cautiously down the dangerous channel during the rest of the afternoon. The narrow passage was the most dangerous part of the breakout. At this time of year not more than 48 kilometer (30 miles) to 64 kilometer (40 miles) wide.
In the early evening, at 1922 the alarm bells on the Bismarck sounded again. The hydrophones and radar had picked up a contact on the port bow of the Bismarck (the distance were about 11 kilometer (7 miles)). Bismarck signalled the alarm to the Prinz Eugen and her lookouts saw a dim shape disappearing into the mist about 20 degrees on the port bow. It was taken to be an auxiliary cruiser (actually it was the British heavy cruiser Suffolk). But the encounter had been so sudden that neither of the German ships had been able to make a definite identification and neither had been able to bring its guns to bear. As soon as the lookouts on Suffolk spotted the German ships. the Suffolk turned toward the coast of Iceland to hide there inside the fog. Suffolk later came around and fell astern of the German task force to begin shadowing it.
A few minutes before 2030 the radar of the Bismarck detected a new contact closing from the port bow (the distance was about 10 kilometer (6 miles)). It was another British heavy cruiser, the Norfolk, which had come up to assist the Suffolk after receiving her sighting report. The British cruiser was in the clear, and the Bismarck immediately took her under fire with her main armament. Five salvos in all Bismarck fired before Norfolk raced into a fog bank as the Suffolk had done earlier. Some straddled, and splinters came on board, but there were no casualties or hits. The Norfolk fell back and joined Suffolk shadowing the German squadron.
The German ships had picked up the sighting report from the Suffolk and advised the German headquarter that they had been detected. The Germans was able to decode the British radio meesages and was aware that the British cruisers were able to shadow the German ships with their radar equipment.
The blast from Bismarck's guns when firing at Norfolk had put her forward radar out of action, and she was now blind ahead. A desire to have eyes in front of him and also perhaps a fear that the shadowing british ships might creep up on Prinz Eugen in bad visibility, caused L黷jens to signal to Prinz Eugen to take station ahead. Now Prinz Eugen was in the lead, Bismarck astern of her, Norfolk and Suffolk ten to fourteen miles astern of Bismarck, all going at nearly thirty knots.
Photo: HMS Hood photographed from Prince of Wales on 23 May 1941, racing to intercept the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.
Throughout the rest of the evening, both forces continued on their convergent courses. The Germans made several attempts during the night to shake off their pursuers, but to no avail. At about 2200, the Bismarck doubled back on her course hoping to catch the British cruisers by surprise, but they were nowhere in sight. The Suffolk had detected the manoeuvre on her radar, and both cruisers disappeared in the fog as the German ship approached. When the Bismarck returned to her original course, both British cruisers resumed their shadowing duties astern of the German task force.
The Germans kept on a course of about 220 |
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The Battle of the Denmark Strait
In the early morning of 24 May the German task force maintained a course of 170 |
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At 0554 Vice-Admiral Holland ordered the British force to make a 20 |
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Photo: The Hood blows up.
At 0600 Hood received the fatal hit and exploded. This was probably the last semi-salvo (C+D) from Bismarck of the 5th salvo. After Hood exploded it was divided on 2 pieces, while it started to sink, the forward turrets (A+B) fired for the last time.
The British ships were just making the turn when this occurred.
The RAF Sunderland Z/201 aircraft (Pilot Flight Ltnt R.J. Vaughn) now headed toward the German ships. Bismarck started to shoot at the aircraft with her anti-aircraft guns.
Bismarck fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) or the 6th full salvo on Hood. The salvo was already planned and could not be diverged so it went out to where Hood had been.
At this point Bismarck received the 3rd hit from Prince of Wales 13th salvo. The damage occurred midship, small boat/catapult, then the shell went outboard.
Prinz Eugen fired 4 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D, A+B and C+D) so 10th and 11th salvo against Prince of Wales.
Prince of Wales fired her 14th salvo from 14.898 meters (16.300 yards), 15th salvo from 13.710 meters (15.000 yards) and 16th salvo from 13.801 (15.100 yards) at Bismarck, all of them fell short.
Norfolk turned to port after Hood exploded, doing so it reduced closing rate distance to the German ships. Now it was 21.000 meters from them.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0601 Hood was sinking, Prince of Wales had to change course quickly, turning to starboard in order not to hit the remains of the British battlecruiser.
Kpt Ltnt Jasper saw in the rangefinders that Prince of Wales turned towards him. Kpt zur See Brinkmann on Prinz Eugen asked Kpt Ltnt Reimann to launch torpedoes at Prince of Wales which was now well into launching range.
Bismarck now changed target to Prince of Wales that now was under fire from both German ships and was forced to turn towards them, closing distance.
The RAF Sunderland Z/201 aircraft (Pilot Flight Ltnt R.J. Vaughn) returned to the clouds due to heavy anti-aircraft fire from Bismarck.
Bismarck fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) or the 7th full salvo at PoW to acquire range from less than 15.000 meters.
Prinz Eugen fired 4 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D, A+B and C+D) or 12th and 13th salvo at Prince of Wales from 14.500 meters.
Prince of Wales fired her 17th salvo from 12.887 meters (14.100 yards) and 18th salvo from 13.253 meters (14.500 yards) at Bismarck, both too short.
Hood started to sink and the stem was high in the air.
Norfolk was still closing in on the German ships being 20.500 meters from them.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards), north of the Germans.
Photo: Bismarck continue to fire against Prince of Wales.
At 0602 Hood was still sinking. Prince of Wales turned around the remains of Hood under close and heavy fire.
Bismarck fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) or the 8th full salvo against Prince of Wales and scored a big hit (1st) on the compass platform from 14.000 meters.
Prinz Eugen fired 4 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D, A+B and C+D) or 14th and 15th salvo to Prince of Wales.
Kpt Ltnt Reimann had not launched any torpedo yet and at this point she was 14.000 meters from Prince of Wales, well within launching range and with the enemy ship in clear difficulties (not even shooting anymore).
Prince of Wales didn't fire anymore now, the 1st hit received from Bismarck had almost killed everybody on the compass platform. The ship was in clear danger.
Hood had almost totally disappeared under the sea, some remains floated around.
Norfolk opened fire (3 salvos) but the shells fell short to Bismarck, from 20.000 meters (21.800 yards).
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0603 Hood was sunk. Prince of Wales was in clear danger and both Prinz Eugen and Bismarck kept firing on her from a very close distance now down to 14.000 meters or even less.
Prince of Wales started to develop a smoke screen to try to make it more difficult for the fire from the German units.
Also the German ships heavy flak (105 mm) guns on port side are shooting at Prince of Wales now.
The sound locator system (GHG = Gruppen-Horch-Ger鋞) on Prinz Eugen reported 3 torpedoes approaching.
Kpt zur See (Captain) Brinkmann on board Prinz Eugen issued a torpedo alarm report having seen two torpedo tracks approaching from 279 |
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At 0604 Prince of Wales was still in huge difficulties and both Prinz Eugen and Bismarck kept on firing on her, but now, due to the aircraft alarm on Bismarck and the torpedo alarm on Prinz Eugen, both German ships had turned hard to starboard loosing firing range and now sailing away from her.
In addition the smoke screen slowly started to be effective, partially covering the Prince of Wales.
Distance increased (more than 14.000 meters), German ships fire was now less accurate and Prinz Eugen has not launched any torpedo against Prince of Wales. The most difficult moment was over. Instead of being under killing fire from a very short distance by both enemy ships and maybe targeted by torpedo, now she has a chance to escape sailing south-east.
Bismarck was on Prinz Eugen's starboard and both German ships was sailing a western course now, increasing distance to Prince of Wales.
Prinz Eugen had just sharply turned to starboard too.
Bismarck fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) or the 10th full salvo at Prince of Wales and scored the last of her 4 hits from 15.500 meters on the British ship, it hit the Walrus aircraft crane.
Prinz Eugen fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) so 18th salvo at Prince of Wales after having adjusted range due to the 1st sharp turn and scores again from 14.500 meters for the last time 2 hits (2nd and 3rd), again on the stern and on a 133 mm turret ammunition deposit, the shell did not explode.
Prince of Wales kept firing (20th salvo) with her Y turret (one gun only) on local control, shell splashes not very close to Bismarck.
Hood was gone.
Norfolk now sailed south-west following and shadowed the German ships from 21.000 meters.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0605 Prince of Wales was now much safer at 15.000 meters from Prinz Eugen and 16.000 meters from Bismarck. The distances increased progressively.
The developing smoke screen now even more covered the British ship.
Fire from German ships was now less and less accurate. Bismarck was on Prinz Eugen's starboard.
Bismarck fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) or the 11th full salvo against Prince of Wales.
Prinz Eugen fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) so 19th salvo against Prince of Wales. Then it had to adjust range again due to another sharp turn.
Prince of Wales fired her 21st and last salvo with her Y turret (one gun) on local control, shell splash fell ahead of Bismarck.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowed the German ships from more than 21.000 meters.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0606 Prince of Wales was now at more than 16.000 meters from Prinz Eugen and 17.000 meters from Bismarck.
Smoke screen increased at Prince of Wales aft.
Fire from German ships was now less and less accurate. Bismarck started a turn to south coming back closing distances to Prince of Wales again.
Bismarck fired 1 semi-salvo (A+B) or the half- 12th full salvo to Prince of Wales.
Prinz Eugen fired 2 semi-salvos (A+B and C+D) or 20th salvo at Prince of Wales than had to adjust range due to the sharp turn, after these shots the A+B turrets of Prinz Eugen stopped firing because of the bearing.
Prince of Wales had ceased fire.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowed the German ships from more than 21.000 meters.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0607 Prince of Wales was now more than 17.000 meters from Prinz Eugen and 18.000 meters from Bismarck, smoke screen increased.
Fire from German ships was now less and less accurate and intense. Bismarck was sailing south and kept on firing slowly now.
Prinz Eugen passed on Bismarck's starboard side, just in front of Bismarck going south and issued another torpedo alarm.
Bismarck fired 1 semi-salvo (C+D) or the half-12th full salvo against Prince of Wales.
Prinz Eugen fired 2 semi-salvos (C+D and C+D ) or 21st salvo to Prince of Wales, Kpt Ltnt Jasper had just passed control to aft firing control and stopped shooting with front turrets (A+B) or after the 28th semi-salvo on Prince of Wales.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowed the German ships from 21.500 meters.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0608 Prince of Wales was now more than 18.000 meters from both Prinz Eugen and Bismarck and smoke screen protected her retreat.
Fire from German ships was now less and less accurate and intense. Bismarck was sailing south, crossing Prinz Eugen's track and kept on firing. Bismarck ordered Prinz Eugen not to overshoot the German battleship.
Prinz Eugen was now on Bismarck's starboard, for the first time she was not the closest German unit to the British battleship.
Bismarck fired 1 semi-salvo (A+B) or the half- 13th full salvo to Prince of Wales.
Prinz Eugen fired 2 semi-salvos (C+D and C+D) or 22nd salvo to Prince of Wales.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowed the German ships from 21.500 meters.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0609 Prince of Wales was now more than 18.500 meters from Bismarck and 19.000 meters from Prinz Eugen and now the smoke screen started to cover entirely the British battleship.
Fire from German ships was now less and less accurate and intense and it would soon end.
Bismarck was heading south and preparred to overtake the Prinz Eugen.
Prinz Eugen received order to cease fire.
Bismarck fired 1 semi-salvo (C+D) or the half- 13th full salvo at Prince of Wales, then ceased fire.
Prinz Eugen fired 2 semi-salvos (C+D and C+D) or 23rd salvo to Prince of Wales, then ceased fire.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowed the German ships from 21.500 meters.
Suffolk still on the horizon but out of the dispute at 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
Bismarck's commander, Captain Ernst Lindemann wanted to finish off the Prince of Wales. L黷jens realised that to pursue the Prince of Wales would be contrary to his standing orders to avoid any engagement with enemy naval units except those defending Allied convoys. He also had to consider that any pursuit could lead the German squadron closer to other British naval units that were undoubtedly on their way to intercept the Bismarck, risking the lives of his ships and crews on a venture that had been expressly forbidden.
At 0610 The battle was over. All ships had ceased fire.
Bismarck had received 3 hits from Prince of Wales.
Prince of Wales had received 7 hits (4 from Bismarck and 3 from Prinz Eugen).
Prinz Eugen had not suffered any damage.
Norfolk and Suffolk had not been targeted by the German ships.
Prinz Eugen was speeding up to her maximum speed to take the lead on Bismarck.
Again the RAF Sunderland Z/201 aircraft (Pilot Flight Commander R.J. Vaughn) came out of the clouds from the portside abaft Prinz Eugen which immediately reacted with an aircraft alarm and opened fire with her anti-aircraft guns, meanwhile the German cruiser increased speed to 32,5 knots.
Prinz Eugen was on Bismarck starboard side again after the second crossover heading south.
Bismarck was sailing south as well just after having ceased fire at 18.500 meters from Prince of Wales.
Prince of Wales was still covered by her smoke screen at 18.500 meters from Bismarck and 19.000 meters from Prinz Eugen.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowing the German ships from 21.500 meters.
Suffolk was far away on north at more than 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
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At 0611 Prinz Eugen was still shooting with anti-aircraft guns.
Prinz Eugen was on Bismarck starboard side going south.
Bismarck was sailing south as well.
Prince of Wales was still covered by her smoke screen at 19.000 meters from Bismarck.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowing the German ships from 21.000 meters.
Suffolk was far away to the north at more than 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0612 Prinz Eugen was still shooting with anti-aircraft (flak) guns.
Prinz Eugen was on Bismarck starboard side going south.
Bismarck was sailing south as well.
Prince of Wales was still covered by her smoke screen at 20.000 meters from Bismarck.
Norfolk still sailed south-west following and shadowing the German ships from 21.000 meters.
Suffolk was far away to the north at more than 28.000 meters (30.600 yards).
At 0613 Bismarck started turning to starboard to re-connect on Prinz Eugen wake and take a course 220 |
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At 0623 Prinz Eugen kept on going south-west at 220 |
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The Bismarck Escapes
Photo: Bismarck as seen from Prinz Eugen shortly after the battle of the Denmark Strait. Notice that her A and B guns are not trained in yet.
Bismarck had received three hits altogether. One had carried away the captain's motor-boat amidships, damaged the aircraft launching gear, landed in the sea beyond without exploding. The second had also struck amidships, penetrated the ship's side beneath the armored belt, destroyed one of the dynamoes, put No. 2 boiler-room and its two boilers out of action, wounded five men by scalding, caused some flooding. The third and most serious hit had struck the port bow about the level of the water-line, penetrated two oil tanks, come out the starboard side without exploding. This hit not only let sea-water into the oil tanks and quantities of oil into the sea, but knocked out the suction valves, and cut off from the engines a further thousand tons of oil.
Because of flooding the bow was down by two or three degrees, there was a list to port of nine degrees, the starboard propeller was coming out of the water. Captain Lindemann ordered counterflooding aft to restore the trim, and maximum speed was reduced to 28 knots. Collision mats were put down to cover the two holes in the bows, divers were sent to the flooded compartments. Presently the collision mats stopped any more water getting into the ship, though the oil continued to leak out of it. Some officers suggested a big reduction of speed and further counterflooding to bring the bows right out of the water, enable the holes to be repaired by welding; but Admiral L黷jens was not prepared to risk the dangers of delay. Schl黷er (a technician from Blohm and Voss) suggested lightening the bows by cutting loose the anchors and cables, dumping them overboard, but this idea was also rejected. Despite the difficult working conditions the divers finaly managed to make temporary repairs, pump out some of the water so the bows began to rise.
But however successfull the repairs, it was clear beyond a doubt to L黷jens and his staff that with one boiler-room out of action, maximum speed reduced to 28 knots, serious flooding and loss of fuel and the ship leaving a pathway of oil that could be seen for miles, Bismarck could no longer carry out her assignment without dockyard repairs.
L黷jens had now decided that the Bismarck needed some repairs in a dockyard. But to wich dockyard should he go? If back to Germany his nearest friendly port was Bergen or Trondheim in Norway, both a little over a thousand miles away. But this meant a return through the hazardous passages north or south of Iceland, with the enemy's air forces now fully alerted, and the possibility that further heavy British units were at sea between him and Scapa Flow.
Photo: The ship yard area at the port of St. Nazaire in France. The huge "Normandie" dry dock, which the Bismarck headed for, can be seen at the center, close to the top on the photograph.
The coast of France was 965 kilometer (600 miles) farther, but meant longer nights and wider seas in wich to shake off his shadowers, perhaps entice them over a line of U-boats, top up with fuel from one of the waiting tankers, then steam unmolested to the huge Normandy dry dock at the French port of St. Nazaire (which had been built for the great French liner Normandie).
A further advantage of this was that once repairs had been effected, Bismarck (with perhaps Scharnhorst and Gneisenau too) would already be poised on the edge of the Atlantic trade-routes instead of having to renegotiate the perils of a second break-out from Germany. That would bring Operation "Rhein黚ung" closer to its original concept. In the meantime, the Prinz Eugen might be able to inflict some damage on British convoys by herself and keep the Royal Navy busy until the new battlegroup could be formed.
At 0801, L黷jens signalled Group North, together with a report on Bismarck's damage and the efficacy of British radar, his intensions to release Prinz Eugen for independent cruiser warfare and for Bismarck to put into St. Nazaire.
Once the action with the Bismarck had been broken off and the Prince of Wales was out of range of German guns, Captain Leach slowed his ship and turned to rendezvous with the Suffolk and Norfolk. The cruisers had continued to follow the German squadron after the Hood was sunk and the Prince of Wales disengaged. As soon as the Norfolk appeared, Leach conferred by signal with Admiral Wake-Walker. The Admiral had to continue the pursuit of the Bismarck, and he ordered the Prince of Wales to join his squadron in that pursuit regardless of the damage she had sustained. She was still a potent fighting machine that might yet be needed to help destroy the Bismarck in conjunction with other units of the Royal Navy en route to intercept the enemy.
About 1000, L黷jens ordered the Prinz Eugen to take up position aft of Bismarck temporarily in order to observe her loss of oil. An hour later, the Prinz Eugen resumed her previous position in front of the Bismarck. At 1240 the German task force changed course to 180 |
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At 2330, the Swordfish obtained visual contact with the Bismarck and attacked. The Bismarck received a single torpedo hit at 2338 on the starboard side, amidships, at the level of the main belt which resisted the impact without much problem. It caused the death of a crewmember (Kurt Kirchberg - who became the first casualty aboard) and injured six others. Except of two Fulmar's wich ran out of fuel, all of the aircraft returned safely to the Victorious in spite of the heavy anti-aircraft fire directed against them and poor visibility as darkness fell.
After the attack of the Swordfish, the Bismarck reduced her speed from 27 to 16 knots to do some repairs in the forecastle. The distance between both forces decreased, and at 0131 on 25 May the Prince of Wales fired two salvos from 15,000 meters (16,000 yards) against the Bismarck which responded with another two salvos. However the visibility was very bad and no hits were scored.
The Admiralty decided that the destruction of the Bismarck was the highest-priority task facing the Royal Navy, and it was willing to take certain risks to achieve that goal. Admiral Somerville's Force H, standing by at Gibraltar, was now committed to the pursuit.
The Prinz Eugen had escaped, and now it was the Bismarck's turn to try to shake her pursuers. During the night, the crew of the Bismarck noted that the British ships were staying on her port quarter and that they had begun zigzagging, probably as a precaution against U-boats believed to have been dispatched to help the Bismarck. Once darkness had fallen, the Suffolk could maintain contact with the Bismarck only by radar, but at times her zigzagging took her temporarily out of radar range of 23,000 (25,000 yards). L黷jens, realising that this might be the case, decided to take advantage of those circumstances and try to break away from his pursuers.
In the early hours of morning of 25 May, the Suffolk was beginning to make another south-eastward swing on her zigzag course which would again put her out of radar contact with the Bismarck for a few moments. When the cruiser seemed to be approaching the limit of her south-eastward swing, L黷jens ordered the Bismarck to make an immediate turn to starboard and to continue almost due west at high speed away from the British force. The manoeuvre worked. When the Suffolk returned to the south-westward leg of her zigzag course, her radar did not pick up the Bismarck as it had done after earlier zigzags. Concentrating on the Bismarck, the Suffolk was not yet aware that the Prinz Eugen had already escaped.
When the loss of radar contact with the Bismarck was reported to Admiral Wake-Walker on the Norfolk, he immediately ordered his two cruisers to steam in a south-westerly and then a westerly direction in an attempt to regain it. L黷jens, however, instead of renewing his southerly course after breaking free, decided to make a wide swing to the north and circle around to the rear of the British ships. Once he had completed the circle, he headed in a southeasterly course of 130 |
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Post time 23-4-2006 08:42 AM
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