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Why Malaysia isn¡¯t afraid of China (for now)

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Author: robotech       Show all posts   Read mode

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Post time 31-12-2013 08:48 PM | Show all posts |Read mode
Why Malaysia isn¡¯t afraid of China (for now)



On 26 March 2013, the People¡¯s Liberation Army Navy conducted a major naval exercise in the South China Sea, close to what China calls Zhengmu Reef. News of the exercise would have been lost amid the constant stream of reports on the disputed waters had it not been for the fact that Zhengmu Reef, which is known as Beting Serupai in Malay and James Shoal in English, lies at the southernmost tip of China¡¯s expansive maritime and island claims in the South China Sea. More specifically, it¡¯s some 80 kilometres away from Malaysia and 1,800 kilometres from the Chinese mainland. Rarely have the Chinese made their presence felt at the extremities of their maritime claims in the region. And never have they brought such firepower with them¡ªfour vessels led by the PLA Navy¡¯s latest amphibious landing ship, the Jinggangshan.

While serving as a sign of China¡¯s rising assertiveness, the exercise was also notable for the distinct lack of a visible public reaction from Malaysia. Neither the Malaysian Prime Minister nor the Foreign Ministry has made even the most perfunctory statement on the matter. Never mind that a Malaysian naval offshore patrol vessel, the KD Perak, monitored the exercise and issued orders for the PLA Navy to leave the area. And never mind that a standard protest may have been quietly expressed through diplomatic channels. In contrast to how such exercises are greeted in Hanoi and Manila, the Malaysian public response has been a deafening silence. So what explains Malaysia¡¯s muted reaction to this overt demonstration of China¡¯s growing power?

Part of the explanation lies in Malaysia¡¯s perception of its relationship with China. It¡¯s seen as unique¡ªperhaps even deserving the term ¡®special¡¯¡ªamong those of its neighbours in Southeast Asia. This isn¡¯t to say that Putrajaya sees itself as having the most intimate of ties with Beijing, and there¡¯s little doubt that Cambodia and Myanmar have closer political relations with China. Nor does it mean that nobody in Malaysia sees China as a potential long-term security challenge. As one might expect, there are some within the Malaysian Armed Forces who observe China¡¯s military build-up with a degree of unease.

But there¡¯s certainly a sense that Malaysia and China have implicitly agreed to pay heed to each other¡¯s legitimate interests and go to extra lengths to avoid playing out their disputes through the media. Furthermore, there¡¯s a perception, at least on the Malaysian side, that the relationship is highly prized and historically significant.

That significance derives from the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People¡¯s Republic of China in 1974. Indeed, Malaysia was the first member state of ASEAN¡ªwhich then also comprised Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand¡ªto have formal relations with China. At a time when Malaysia and many other ASEAN member states had to contend with communist insurgencies¡ªall backed in varying degrees by Beijing¡ªa rapprochement with China should have been unthinkable. Nonetheless, the Malaysian prime minister at the time, Tun Abdul Razak, moved to establish relations with China, partly in the hope that Beijing would stop supporting the insurgent Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Beijing didn¡¯t immediately accede to Tun Razak¡¯s request, but by the late 1970s it was gradually being met.

Whether or not Tun Razak¡¯s overtures were instrumental in Beijing¡¯s subsequent curtailment of its support for the CPM can certainly be disputed. Given that the late 1970s saw the beginnings of China¡¯s reform and opening up, a more accommodating posture towards its neighbours could well have been expected in any event.

But in Malaysia, ¡®Razak to China¡¯ continues to be regarded as a signal event in the country¡¯s diplomatic history. It¡¯s a notion that China seems keen to perpetuate, and that suits Malaysia just fine. For instance, whenever Malaysian officials visit China¡ªeven to the most remote parts of the country¡ªChinese officials rarely neglect to thank Malaysia for being the first ASEAN member state to establish diplomatic relations with China. While it¡¯s likely that such sentiments are expressed on instructions from Beijing, they nevertheless generate a positive atmosphere for interactions between the two countries. They also serve to underscore the idea that China has a long memory, that it never forgets kindnesses (or injuries, for that matter).

All of this might be read cynically as a capitulation to China¡¯s growing might and a naive acceptance of its diplomatic rhetoric. But would it make sense for Malaysia to adopt a more muscular approach towards China?

It¡¯s hard to argue that it would, at least for now. In general, China¡¯s treated Malaysia with kid gloves on their overlapping maritime claims. Unlike in the case of the Philippines and Vietnam, China hasn¡¯t publicly objected to Malaysia¡¯s oil and gas explorations in the South China Sea. Looking at the bigger picture, China is Malaysia¡¯s largest trading partner, and no other Southeast Asian country trades as much with China as Malaysia does. In 2012, the Chinese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was the second-largest issuer of Chinese visas in the world. Given the intensity and benefits of the relationship, it hardly makes sense for Malaysia to depart from its current policy, which puts a premium on quiet diplomacy with China.

Nonetheless, Malaysia¡¯s unlikely to allow itself to become so overwhelmed by China that its independence of action in the international arena is stymied. In other words, Malaysia will hedge against becoming ¡®Finlandised¡¯ by China. This primarily takes the form of Malaysia¡¯s strong and growing defence relationship with the US. The burgeoning defence ties between the two countries are perhaps best illustrated by the increasing number of US naval ship visits to Malaysia, which grew from single digits annually in the previous decade to over 30 in 2011.

Even so, there are distinct limits to the relationship between Malaysia and the US. Washington remains deeply unpopular, or is at least viewed with suspicion, among significant sections of Malaysia¡¯s Muslim-majority population. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Washington¡¯s continuing failure to act as an impartial broker in the Palestinian¨CIsraeli peace process have served to entrench a negative view of the US among some Malaysians. So seriously does the Malaysian Government view such sentiments that few details of the 1984 Bilateral Training and Consultative Group (BITACG) Agreement, which underpins the defence relationship between Malaysia and the US, have ever been made public.

But might those limits in the Malaysia¨CUS relationship be eroded over time, perhaps as China¡¯s might increases? For now, there seems to be very little appetite in Malaysia for a hard balancing approach. Rightly or wrongly, the Malaysian foreign policy establishment continues to view China in positive terms. Even as Malaysia heads towards a highly competitive general election on 5 May, none of the political parties has thus far made even the barest mention of the Zhengmu Reef incident. It¡¯s as if the Malaysia¨CChina relationship¡¯s been placed in a special, politicisation-resistant category. Clearly, the benefits of a strong and close relationship with China remain irresistible.

So, for now, Malaysian leaders will continue to embrace China¡¯s rise and give it the benefit of the doubt. They¡¯ll continue to downplay regional anxieties about China¡¯s military build-up. But if China decides that amphibious landing ships are the best tools to resolve disputes, Malaysia may well need to rethink its present approach.

Shahriman Lockman is a Senior Analyst in the Foreign Policy and Security Studies program at ISIS in Malaysia. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

A version of this article was originally published in the April 2013 edition of OrrizonteCina, a newsletter on contemporary China edited by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Torino World Affairs Institute (T.wai).


Source:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au ... d-of-china-for-now/
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 Author| Post time 31-12-2013 09:01 PM | Show all posts
Xi Jinping and the Sabah enigma


Sabah is located at the centre of maritime Southeast Asia.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has been a busy man of late. Fresh from a whirlwind tour of central Asian states and international summits in September, he¡¯s been on the road again¡ªthis time to Southeast Asia.

The Southeast Asian tour included official visits to Indonesia and Malaysia and the APEC conference in Bali. Xi signed economic agreements with Indonesia and Malaysia, while stressing the resurgence of a ¡®Maritime Silk Road.¡¯ Rhetoric of shared prosperity, growing mutual trade and ¡®win-win¡¯ situations was accompanied by a proposal for an Infrastructural Development Bank, all of which we were told would contribute to a new ¡®diamond decade¡¯ in China¨CASEAN relations.

Everything seems to have gone according to plan in Southeast Asia. But did it?

Let¡¯s return to late August this year. After a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing, Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman announced that Xi would visit Malaysia in October, spending 4¨C5 October in Kuala Lumpur and 5¨C6 October in Sabah. The planned visit was reported in the Malaysian press and the Sabah Chinese community began anxiously preparing for the occasion. However, cancellation of the Sabah visit was informally announced on 6 October, without explanation.

An enigma, indeed! Malaysia doesn¡¯t encourage any visiting dignitary to travel to the Bornean states, and given that the programme was announced after talks in Beijing, it seems a reasonable assumption that the proposed visit was a PRC suggestion. But to what end was the visit proposed and why was it cancelled? We don¡¯t have answers to these questions, but we can extrapolate on the basis of two factors¡ªthe sensitivity of Sabah for the Malaysian government and the potential importance of Sabah for the Chinese government.

The fragility of the Malaysian state isn¡¯t always recognised. It¡¯s only 50 years old, cobbled together in 1963 by a decolonising British Empire by bringing together the states and settlements of the peninsula with the state of Singapore (later expelled) and a number of British-associated territories in the north of Borneo. It was an unexpected nation, but it made sense from a British perspective in a Cold War context, as it constituted an anti-Communist bulwark in the middle of Southeast Asia between China and Indonesia.

Sabah, one of the two Bornean states shoehorned into Malaysia in 1963, remains an extremely sensitive part of the country. Malaysia has assumed the obligations of the former British North Borneo Company and continues to pay the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu a recompense of 5,000 ringgit annually. In addition, the Philippines reasserted its claim to Sabah as recently as 2011 and in early 2013, there was a bloody stand-off between more than 100 Sulu people and Malaysian forces, over a territorial claim to the area. On the Sabah maritime borders, the overlapping South China Sea claims provide an even more complicating environment. There are also internal Christian-Muslim tensions.

Given these conditions, why then would the President of China have planned to spend half of his official visit to Malaysia in Sabah? Initial plans were apparently for him to open a Chinese consulate, a Chinese bank and a Confucius Institute in the state capital Kota Kinabalu. The Chinese Consul-General in Kuching, Li Shugang, has suggested that China¡¯s activities in the area will double if a consulate is opened in Sabah. At the same time, the Sabah government is actively promoting PRC investment in the state and business migrant delegations from China are being feted. Former PRC foreign minister Yang Jiechi visited Sabah in August last year to boost Chinese investment in infrastructure, palm oil processing and agriculture.

Even without a consulate, Chinese tourism to the area has boomed, with probably 300,000 PRC tourists expected to arrive in Sabah this year, on charter flights, which have increased by 90% over a year. The PRC naval training ship Zheng He has also just made a visit to Sabah.

But the most important role Sabah can play in China¡¯s plans for the future derives from its location as the precise centre of maritime Southeast Asia. Given China¡¯s claims to the majority of the South China Sea and its overall blue-water naval aspirations, a naval base located in Sabah would allow it unparalleled access to the South China Sea and to Southeast Asia more generally.

This could occur by way of joint economic and defence agreements. At the recent 16th ASEAN¨CChina Summit, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang urged bilateral joint development of South China Sea areas commonly claimed. Malaysia¡¯s Prime Minister Najib Razak agreed that such discussions could be pursued. Also, after meeting PM Najib, Xi Jinping reported: ¡®We have agreed to strengthen our partnership with naval defense, joint military exercises to combat terrorism, transnational crime and promote security. This will create a sound environment for peace and the prosperity of both countries.¡¯ Any such joint defence arrangements or military activities may well include naval facilities in Sabah.

And longer-term possibilities and calculations shouldn¡¯t be excluded. The relations between Kuala Lumpur and the Bornean states have always been fractious and the incongruousness of having two parts of a nation divided by ethnicity, economic interests, perceptions of exploitation, and by a huge swathe of sea is increasingly apparent.

It¡¯s not difficult to imagine a situation where the existing cleavage between the peninsular and Bornean states of Malaysia widens to a degree where any existing national unity dissolves. If that happened, any entity with established economic interests and political links with Sabah would be well-positioned, and could provide any new state with economic benefits far beyond those which Kuala Lumpur currently assigns it. The stationing of naval forces would then be a matter of formality.

As we ponder the reasons behind the planning and then the cancellation of President Xi¡¯s visit to Sabah, both the domestic situation of Sabah within Malaysia and China¡¯s aspirations within Southeast Asia are informative. The complexities of the Sabah situation, historical and otherwise, also suggest that this former backwater of Southeast Asia will not long remain in the shadows and will likely soon become a rather prominent pawn in the global competition within Southeast Asia.

Geoff Wade researches China¨CSoutheast Asia relations. He developed the China¨CASEAN and China¨CIndia Projects at the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong and subsequently worked with the Southeast Asia¨CChina Cluster of the Asia Research Institute, Singapore.

Source:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/xi-jinping-and-the-sabah-enigma/
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 Author| Post time 31-12-2013 09:02 PM | Show all posts
Reader response: Chinese military bases in Malaysia



I think Geoff Wade has overstated China¡¯s interest in Sabah and Malaysia¡¯s willingness to work militarily with a big power such as China.

Except for its traditional allies (US, UK, Australia, NZ & Singapore), I¡¯d find it unimaginable for any other power such as China to have close defence ties with Malaysia for four main reasons.

The first is historical: Malaysia is firmly in the US orbit, and moving even closer now under the Najib administration. Malaysia votes with the United States at least 85% of the time at the UN, and in recent years has moved away from its ¡®hybrid neutrality¡¯, towards a more pronounced support of the US (eg. voting to sanction Iran).

Second, there¡¯s an ideological challenge. Despite recognising China, Malaysia still views communism as a threat. The communist ideology is an anathema to many Malaysians, especially Muslims. As well, the bitter experience of conflict between the Malayan Communist Party and the Allied forces (including Malaysians) during the Malayan Emergency of the 1950s is still very much alive among many Malaysians. In fact, the ruling party is regularly criticised by the opposition for this ¡®hypocritical stance¡¯ of banning the ideology, but having close ties with CPC at the political level.

Third, precisely because of the political and social cleavages Geoff identifies, the central government won¡¯t allow any other force (except for its allies) to have a military presence in Sabah, for fear of providing any incentive to the state powers who may have remote thoughts of seceding.

But all the same, any credible politician, both the ruling party and opposition parties in Sabah, has no interest in secession from Malaysia. While East Malaysian politicians from all side of the divide want a better deal for their states, there¡¯s no talk whatsoever of secession. They may want Chinese investment and tourism, but certainly not Chinese military presence.

Defence is a central government purview, and hence state governments will have no or little say in Malaysia¡¯s defence relationships. Deep defence relationships like a shared naval base is an unlikely step: while there are issues of piracy and terrorism, Malaysia will most likely prefer other forms of collaboration (joint patrols, sharing of intelligence, etc.).

And finally, to make it implausible, I think all the ASEAN nations (except for some of the smaller states such as Laos) want to avoid big power competition in the region. I don¡¯t think any ASEAN member state will want any Chinese military presence in ASEAN¡¯s neighbourhood, including Malaysia. I don¡¯t see Malaysia jeopardising its (and ASEAN¡¯s) long-standing policy of avoiding big power competition in the region.

While ASEAN wants to work with China to find ways to resolve disputes in the South China Seas, allowing China military bases in the region isn¡¯t likely to be one of them.

Greg Lopez is a visiting fellow at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

Source:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reader-response-chinese-military-bases-in-malaysia/



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 Author| Post time 31-12-2013 09:05 PM | Show all posts
China and Malaysia To Hold Maritime Exercises: What Gives?

China and Malaysia will conduct their first military exercises next year.

In a somewhat novel maritime development in the South China Sea, China and Malaysia have agreed to hold joint military exercises next year, following up on a Memorandum of Understanding the two signed in 2005. The exercises were confirmed by Malaysian defense minister Hishammuddin Hussein towards the end of October. The two states formally held their first defense and security consultation in Kuala Lumpur in late 2012.

Despite the vagueness of the statement, Hishammuddin confirmed that the exercises would contain a strong maritime element. Beyond the fact that the drills are planned for next year, there are no details about their scope, location, or which military branches will participate. According to Defense News, Hishamuddin invited his Chinese counterpart, General Chang Wanquan, "to visit the Malaysian naval base of Mawilla 2 in the South China Sea on the island of Borneo.¡±

The announcement came just two weeks after reports that Malaysia would establish a marine corps and a naval base close to the James Shoal, which in waters in the South China Sea (SCS) claimed by both China and Malaysia. According to IHS Jane¡¯s Defence Weekly, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) is expected to set up a base at Bintulu in the South China Sea "to protect the surrounding area and oil reserves.¡±

The James Shoal ¨C 60 nautical miles from this location ¨C was the site of a PLAN exercise in March 2013. Janes cites that exercise as an example of "China asserting its claims to most of the SCS.¡± It continues that the marine corps announcement "follows a number of unpublicised incursions by Chinese naval and maritime surveillance forces into Malaysian waters off East Malaysia and the Malaysian portion of the Spratly Islands.¡±

In a piece written in March 2013, appearing in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute¡¯s blog The Strategist, Shahriman Lockman underscored the muted Malaysia reaction to China¡¯s exercise at the James Shoal. Lockman said, "the exercise was also notable for the distinct lack of a visible public reaction from Malaysia. Neither the Malaysian Prime Minister nor the Foreign Ministry has made even the most perfunctory statement on the matter. Never mind that a Malaysian naval offshore patrol vessel, the KD Perak, monitored the exercise and issued orders for the PLA Navy to leave the area. And never mind that a standard protest may have been quietly expressed through diplomatic channels.¡±

In Lockman¡¯s analysis, Malaysia is somewhat of an exceptional case in ASEAN vis-¨¤-vis China on security matters owing to its historical significance, among other factors. On defense issues, the two have pledged to establish high-level cooperation since 2000, when they signed a long-term cooperative framework agreement. Southeast Asia expert and fellow Flashpoints columnist, Carl Thayer writes that the agreement "included a defense clause calling for an exchange program of high-level visits, study tours, seminars, ship visits, and cooperation in training, research and development, and intelligence sharing. In addition, the agreement also called for cooperation between national defense industries to include reciprocal visits, exhibitions, seminars and workshops to explore the possibility of joint or co-production projects.¡± Thayer notes that China and Malaysia conduct bilateral relations on the level of ¡°strategic partners."

Xi Jinping has also talked of establishing a ¡°maritime silk road¡± with ASEAN states ¨C a proposal that was met with considerable skepticism across Southeast Asia given the scope of territorial disputes with China in the SCS. Xi¡¯s proposal is expected to direct Chinese attention and investment towards establishing "a web of trade links and better connectivity between ports and maritime co-operation.¡± The move to conduct maritime exercises with Malaysia may be an attempt to foment the latter ¨C Xi and Li, during their recent visits to Southeast Asia, did emphasize the concept quite a bit.

The decision to conduct these exercises also flies in the face of ASEAN¡¯s strategy against China. The ten-member body has been trying to present a united front against China, which is perceived as a regional ¡°bully¡± by some. The Diplomat was unable to determine if the decision to follow-up on the 2005 MOU on Defense Cooperation was initiated by the Chinese side or the Malaysia side. The reaction from other ASEAN states to the decision is sure to be negative, especially considering the very recent flare-ups of maritime disputes between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. At this point, it's anyone's guess if Malaysia and China are maritime partners or competitors in the South China Sea.

Source:
http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/c ... ercises-what-gives/
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 Author| Post time 31-12-2013 09:07 PM | Show all posts
Chinese, Malaysian armed forces vow to enhance cooperation

2013-12-24  
Editor: Mo Hong'e

Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan met on Tuesday with Chief of Malaysian Armed Forces Zulkifeli Mohd. Zin, pledging to further enhance pragmatic cooperation and exchanges between armed forces of the two countries.

China and Malaysia share long-term traditional friendship, said Chang.

The two countries have upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, he said, calling on the two armed forces to take this as an opportunity to strengthen cooperation and make positive contributions to safeguarding the common interests of both sides as well as regional peace and stability.

China and Malaysia upgraded bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership during Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Malaysia in October.

Zulkifeli said Malaysia attaches great importance to developing military relations with China.

He reaffirmed Malaysia's willingness to strengthen bilateral military ties and promote pragmatic cooperation between the two armed forces.

Source:
http://www.ecns.cn/military/2013/12-24/94064.shtml
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 Author| Post time 31-12-2013 09:09 PM | Show all posts
China, Malaysia eye closer military cooperation

2013-12-25
Editor: Mo Hong'e

China and Malaysia on Tuesday agreed to strengthen military cooperation through joint drills and exchanges between the two naval forces.

During the talks with Chief of Malaysian Armed Forces Zulkifeli Mohd. Zin, Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Fang Fenghui said the two armed forces have conducted fruitful cooperation in areas such as exchange of high-level visits, personnel training and exchange of visits of naval vessels.

China would like to lift bilateral military ties to a new height through joint drills, military education and exchanges between the two navies, said Fang.

Zulkifeli said Malaysia attaches great importance to the military ties with China, adding that the Malaysian side is ready to forge ahead the relationship.

The two sides also have an in-depth exchange of views on the issue of the South China Sea.

Source:
http://www.ecns.cn/military/2013/12-25/94143.shtml
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 Author| Post time 31-12-2013 09:12 PM | Show all posts
Police seek to expand jurisdiction over Malaysia waters, says Ahmad Zahid

PUTRAJAYA, Dec 17 ¡ª The Royal Malaysia Police has asked the government to review the area under its jurisdiction so as to also cover the country¡¯s waters up to five nautical miles, said Home Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi.

He said the area was now under the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) which took over from the Marine Police the role of policing the waters up to 12 nautical miles in 2011.  

This request was not to sideline the role of the MMEA, but to facilitate arrests and implement enforcement measures up to five nautical miles of the nation¡¯s waters, he said.  

¡°It is to expand the area of responsibility of the police, with the area beyond five nautical miles to come under the jurisdiction of the MMEA and beyond that, to the navy,¡± he told reporters after the outgoing ambassador of China to Malaysia Datuk Chai Xi called on him here today.   

Earlier, at a media conference with Chai Xi, Ahmad Zahid (picture) said his discussions with the envoy also touched on plans to send Malaysian officers to China for training in the gathering and analyses of intelligence information.

The minister said they shared the opinion that close Malaysia-China cooperation had long been established and the current second stage of cooperation also covered efforts to send Malaysian officers, possibly from the immigration department or police, to get more exposure in China.

He said the government was also considering the purchase of equipment or assets from China for use by enforcement agencies under the Home Ministry.

¡°China has a defence and security industry from which we can learn. At this early stage, maybe we can use sophisticated equipment in Malaysia, such as the high definition closed circuit television which can be stationed at several hot spots,¡± he said.

Zahid said several other areas of cooperation were also discussed and planned for implementation in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of Malaysia-China diplomatic relations on May 31 next year
.

¡ª Bernama
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Post time 31-12-2013 09:31 PM | Show all posts
On 26 March 2013, the People¡¯s Liberation Army Navy conducted a major naval exercise in the South China Sea, close to what China calls Zhengmu Reef. News of the exercise would have been lost amid the constant stream of reports on the disputed waters had it not been for the fact that Zhengmu Reef, which is known as Beting Serupai in Malay and James Shoal in English, lies at the southernmost tip of China¡¯s expansive maritime and island claims in the South China Sea. More specifically, it¡¯s some 80 kilometres away from Malaysia and 1,800 kilometres from the Chinese mainland. Rarely have the Chinese made their presence felt at the extremities of their maritime claims in the region. And never have they brought such firepower with them¡ªfour vessels led by the PLA Navy¡¯s latest amphibious landing ship, the Jinggangshan.

While serving as a sign of China¡¯s rising assertiveness, the exercise was also notable for the distinct lack of a visible public reaction from Malaysia. Neither the Malaysian Prime Minister nor the Foreign Ministry has made even the most perfunctory statement on the matter.

Of course there was no reaction from Malaysia. Why would the malaysian govt make any statement every time the chinese navy make an imaginary exercise ?

Where is proof that the pussy chinese navy got to james shoal ?
Show some hard evidence. And forget about that stupid chinese propaganda video.

James shoal is completely underwater.

By displaying video of chinese marines landing on some island purported to be james shoal , the chinese navy only implicated themselves as myopic illiterates on top of being demented chicken shit
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 Author| Post time 31-12-2013 09:38 PM | Show all posts
BotakChinPeng posted on 31-12-2013 09:31 PM
Of course there was no reaction from Malaysia. Why would the malaysian govt make any statement eve ...

There's reasons why people don't take you seriously. Stands to reasons people take your statements with grain of salt. Seriously, atleast contribute something rather than propagandatastic rhetorics of old.
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Post time 31-12-2013 09:42 PM | Show all posts
chinese navy ships only dare enter territorial water of other countries such as viernam, philippines, indonesia.

When it comes to Malaysia the chinese only send plane loads of their women to provide pleasure for malaysian men
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Post time 31-12-2013 09:47 PM | Show all posts
robotech posted on 31-12-2013 09:38 PM
There's reasons why people don't take you seriously. Stands to reasons people take your statements ...

James Shoal is comletely below water.

The chinese navy just got caught bullshitting.

Too bad

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Post time 31-12-2013 09:49 PM | Show all posts
kesimpulannya kak rosmah comel
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Post time 31-12-2013 10:01 PM | Show all posts
Never mind that a Malaysian naval offshore patrol vessel, the KD Perak, monitored the exercise and issued orders for the PLA Navy to leave the area.
I'm sorry but "never mind" is just not good enough.

Got to furnish solid evidence

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Post time 31-12-2013 10:04 PM | Show all posts
robotech posted on 31-12-2013 09:38 PM
There's reasons why people don't take you seriously. Stands to reasons people take your statements ...
There's reasons why people don't take you seriously.

Am I supposed to care ?
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Post time 31-12-2013 10:06 PM | Show all posts
Why malaysia is not afarid of china for now ?

Because the malaysan air force could still repel a full scale attack by the chinese air force for now
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Post time 31-12-2013 10:10 PM | Show all posts
robotech posted on 31-12-2013 09:05 PM
China and Malaysia To Hold Maritime Exercises: What Gives?

China and Malaysia will conduct their  ...
And never mind that a standard protest may have been quietly expressed through diplomatic channels.¡±

"Never mind"...."may have"....."never mind"...... "may have" .....

This Shahriman Lockman is pathetic

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Post time 31-12-2013 10:43 PM | Show all posts
Duh,
Malaysian govt did not issue any statement because they never bother commenting on cheapskate chinese navy delusions.

Figure it out
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Post time 31-12-2013 10:54 PM | Show all posts
robotech posted on 31-12-2013 09:05 PM
China and Malaysia To Hold Maritime Exercises: What Gives?

China and Malaysia will conduct their  ...
¡± It continues that the marine corps announcement "follows a number of unpublicised incursions by Chinese naval and maritime surveillance forces into Malaysian waters off East Malaysia and the Malaysian portion of the Spratly Islands.¡±


Got any proof ?
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Post time 31-12-2013 10:56 PM | Show all posts
Janes Defence publications is a joke.

These are the same idiots who said Malaysian MiG-29s were all going to be placed in storage several years ago
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Post time 31-12-2013 11:09 PM | Show all posts
The legendary man with special hole with frequent PMS talks shit again with wild imaginary facts of his own world. Again I would like to ask this denial-live in his own world sucker, ''Ko datang bulan lagi kah?''
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