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[Dunia]
MH370: Why haven’t we found MH370 yet? – Denis Thomas
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This report describes the results of an independent analysis of the publicly available information related to the flight and disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370:
* Malaysia Ministry of Transport MH370 preliminary report 03/2014
* Inmarsat MH370 data log May 23 2014
* ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Bureau) report AE-2014-054 June 26 2014
* ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Bureau) report update October 8, 2014
This aircraft must be found to answer numerous questions for the sake of the families of the passengers and crew, and to discover the cause of the incident so steps can be taken to ensure this does not happen again.
If the aircraft is not found in the present search area in the Southern Indian Ocean (no sign of any wreckage as of October 2014) then perhaps this report can help the authorities re-evaluate the Inmarsat recorded data in a new light to define further search areas.
A computer flight path model was constructed which evaluated literally millions of possible flight paths for MH370, starting at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport, and continuing, flight leg by flight leg, “ping ring” to “ping ring”, to the final so called “7th arc” at 0019 UTC (8.19am MYT), looking for flight paths that matched the Inmarsat recorded BTO (Burst Timing Offset) and BFO (Burst Frequency Offset) data.
Any analysis or modelling exercise is based on the assumptions you make, or in other words, the scenario which is being modelled. Change the assumptions and you change the outcome. The modelling assumptions are described as a timeline in a possible scenario for the MH370 flight. This scenario is only meant to help explain the assumptions that were used in the model and analysis, and reflect one interpretation based on limited publicly available information and speculation and is by no means meant to represent what actually happened on this flight – that is up to the Accident Investigation authorities.
Many different scenarios were examined, test flown in a Boeing B777 flight simulator, and discussed with a B777 pilot, looking for realistic possibilities. All I can say is that the scenario used for this modelling analysis is plausible, but certainly just guesswork.
The key assumptions are: a) flight MH370 was subject to some emergency situation having just passed the Igari waypoint which disabled all communications and initiated a turn back towards Malaysia, b) the flight crew remained in control of the aircraft for many hours doing their best to safely return the aircraft, crew, and passengers to earth and c) the Inmarsat data log data is correct, just subject to alternative interpretations.
Who am I? A retired electronics and computer systems Engineer, president of TCS, a very small computer systems consulting company in Canada, an unlicensed amateur pilot and flight simulator enthusiast, who has followed this tragic story and would hope that this effort helps in some small way to eventually provide some closure to this saga.
artikel ni agak teknikal..
Read more at http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/why-havent-we-found-mh370-yet-part-1-denis-thomas
aku da cuba paste the whole artikel tapi x berjaya
@kelana36 @razhar @ zainmahmud Last edited by ctrl+F on 18-11-2014 09:52 PM
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The key assumptions are: a) flight MH370 was subject to some emergency situation having just passed the Igari waypoint which disabled all communications and initiated a turn back towards Malaysia, b) the flight crew remained in control of the aircraft for many hours doing their best to safely return the aircraft, crew, and passengers to earth and c) the Inmarsat data log data is correct, just subject to alternative interpretations.
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Conclusion artikel tu
Conclusions
If the aircraft is not found in the present search area in the Southern Indian Ocean (no sign of any wreckage as of October 2014) then perhaps this report can help the authorities re-evaluate the Inmarsat recorded data in a new light to define further search areas.
If indeed this does represent the flight path and final location of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 then it does explain why no wreckage or debris has ever been found in the search areas thousands of miles away. It does however paint a tragic “so near yet so far” ending to a desperate situation in which everyone involved was doing their professional best.
Once again, the scenario presented here is only meant to help explain the assumptions that were used in the model and analysis, and reflects one interpretation based on limited publicly available information and speculation and is by no means meant to represent what actually happened on this flight – that is up to the Accident Investigation authorities.
Why was this aircraft not tracked by radar? It would not have registered on ATC Secondary Radar if the transponders were still malfunctioning, but may very well have been picked up by Military Primary Radar. However it would not have drawn undue attention as it would have appeared as just another commercial airliner on a flight path to or from Kuala Lumpur International. If the radar tapes from March 8, 2014 are still available, that would be a good starting point to help confirm or repudiate this scenario.
This report was sent to the Malaysian Ministry of Transport, Malaysian Airlines, and to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau on November 2, 2014.
One way or another, my hope is that one day the final resting place of 9M-MRO MH370 is found to answer numerous questions for the sake of the families of the passengers and crew, and to discover the true cause of this tragic incident. – November 17, 2014.
* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insider. Last edited by ctrl+F on 19-11-2014 11:29 PM
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zaman sekarang ni tidak mustahil sebenarnya untuk mengesan kapal laut atau kapalterbang yang hilang samada di lautan luas atau di hutan besar seperti the Amazon..
Sebelum berlepas, ada paperwork, which is a legal document yang menyatakan dengan jelas jenis jenis cargo yang dibawa , jumlah dan nama nama penumpang, banyak mana minyak dibawa dan berat keseluruhan pesawat itu semasa berlepas. Dengan data tersebut, a flight simulator jenis yg sama boleh digunakan untuk membuat simulasi sejauh mana pesawat itu boleh terbang sebelum "terpaksa" mendarat kerana kehabisan minyak, dengan berbagai variable boleh di input seperti sebelah enjin rosak, terbang pada paras rendah, kelajuan yang berbeza beza dan macam macam lagi.
selanjutnya, mencari arah kemana pesawat itu pergi. So far ada data dari imarsat so boleh la bagi anggaran hala kemana pesawat itu pergi, tetapi itu hanya anggaran, berasaskan kepada doppler effect, iaitu mendapatkan jarak pesawat itu dari satelite yg diguna . Kemudian membuat jigsaw puzzle antara data imarsat dan simulator untuk pinpoint possible 'landed' area. So far dah pinpoint kat South Hindi Ocean tetapi sesudah sekian lama mencari disitu tak juga jumpa, sepatutnya lah recalculate dan reevaluate semula data2 tersebut untuk pinpoint tempat yang lain pulak. Possibilities sangat banyak di sini, unless pencari masih percaya dan yakin pesawat itu terbang dengan sendiri menghala keselatan, tanpa ada input dari juruterbang untuk mengubah haluan.
kena consider juga situasi seperti nahas tanjung kupang, dimana kedua juruterbang telah terbunuh, seorang steward telah masuk ke cockpit , mencuba untuk menerbangkan pesawat itu tetapi tersalah handling, menyebabkan pesawat itu berkecai. |
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bila baca artikel kat atas, semacam ada benda yg disembunyikan oleh pihak yg berkepentingan. kalau dah berbulan cari tak jumpa, biasanya pihak penyiasat akan kaji semula langkah2 yg telah diambil. |
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Scenario
This describes a possible scenario that takes place aboard MH370 as a mechanism used to describe all of the assumptions and data used in the computer model, presented as a timeline from 12am MYT (1600 UTC) March 8, 2014 to 8.19am MYT. I reiterate that this is my interpretation and guesswork based on limited publicly available information and speculation and is by no means meant to represent what actually happened on this flight.
0000 MYT
Aircraft systems are powered up by the flight crew and/or ground support personnel. This initiates the first power-on sequence with the Inmarsat-3 F1 satellite and ground station in Perth Australia. From the Inmarsat data logs:
Legend:
INX: the index reference used in the computer model
R: reference information – not used in the computer model
F: fixed waypoint – fixed time & fixed location
V: variable waypoint – fixed time but unknown location
T: heading change – time, position, heading determined by the computer
Raduis is the “ring radius” in great circle nautical miles from the satellite footprint (latitude longitude) at that time, based on the conical satellite angle derived from the BTO (Burst Timing Offset) value per the formula described in the ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Bureau) report AE-2014-054.
BFOs (Burst Frequency Offsets) calculations are complex and involve determination of satellite and aircraft movements and the resulting line-of-sight vector velocities which cause a Doppler shift in the uplink and downlink carrier frequencies, as well as some interesting frequency shift compensation carried out by the aircraft and ground stations.
The first few waypoints (index reference) were used to confirm the model algorithms.
KUL Gate C1 2.748N 101.712E Runway 32R “hold short” 2.748N 101.722E
Inmarsat-3 F1 position/footprint at 16:00 0.960N 64.555E
Actual distance satellite footprint to KUL gate C1: 2231 nm
Calculated distance from BTO value by the computer model: 2233.3 nm
Recorded BFO: 85
Calculated BFO: 84.61
0028 MYT
MH370 requests push back and engine start at gate C1 KUL Kuala Lumpur.
0041 MYT
MH370 cleared for takeoff runway 32R. Liftoff at 00:41:43.
00:42:10 Cleared to FL180 direct to waypoint Igari.
0056 MYT
Acars data sent. Flightradar24 reports FL282 heading 25° speed 460 knots.
0107 MYT
MH370 confirms at FL350. ACARS data sent indicating location (5.27N 102.79E) altitude: FL350, heading: 25° speed: 468 knots, fuel: 43,800kg (96,562 lbs).
Calculated distance from BTO value: 2305.6nm
Actual distance satellite footprint to known aircraft position: 2303nm
Calculated BFO: 132.66
Measured BFO: 132
0119 MYT
MH370 handed off to Ho Chi Minh ATC. MH370 confirms “Good night Malaysian 370”.
0121 MYT
Flightradar24 reports FL350 heading 40° speed 471 knots at waypoint Igari located at 6.948N 103.577E.
At 01:21:13 the radar label for MH370 disappears from the radar screen at Kuala Lumpur Radar in the Kuala Lumpur Air Traffic Control Centre. This is indicative of loss of an aircraft transponder signal. |
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Event
At this point something happened to MH370. We may not ever know exactly what. And here the speculation begins: and your assumptions depend on what you believe happened.
The following assumptions are mine (although many others share the same assumptions) and are presented here only to explain the reasoning built into the computer flight model.
The key assumption is there was a serious, but not catastrophic, problem with the aircraft systems and/or cargo and that the flight crew were doing their best, based on their training and extensive experience, to handle the emergency and provide for the safety of the passengers, crew, and aircraft.
But unfortunately something did go wrong. It seems unlikely that the aircraft suffered a catastrophic event at this point such as a fire, engine explosion, or explosive/rapid cabin decompression – in any of these situations the flight crew would have landed at the nearest suitable airport and would not prolong the flight.
The assumption here is that a serious, but not life threatening, electrical problem occurred (perhaps due to a problem in the forward cargo hold, or a electrical component/generator failed with cascading effects which tripped multiple breakers) and/or the flight crew were presented with multiple warnings and disconnected generators and bus ties in fear of having a potential disastrous electrical fire.
The B777 has a very sophisticated electrical system with multiple levels of backup, so it is highly unlikely that they “lost power”. As a result of this event all radio equipment, including the transponder, appear to have been permanently disabled. Power to the satellite communications equipment was temporarily lost at this point or shortly thereafter.
Presumably with the autopilot disconnected and flying on standby instruments, they concentrated on getting the aircraft manually stabilised and then turned southwest heading back towards Malaysia and appeared to head towards the nearest airport with a long runway, namely the Penang International Airport with a 3,480m (11,410ft) runway.
0128 MYT to 0222 MYT
Between 0128 and 0222 an aircraft believed to be MH370 was tracked by military primary radar which does not depend on an aircraft’s transponder signals.
By 0152 the aircraft was approaching Penang International and had descended to a lower altitude just south of the airport.
Assumptions:
With no radio communication and possibly no navigation radios, the flight crew may have tried to contact the Penang Airport by using a cell phone. If they could not notify airport personnel of their approach (primary operating hours at Penang are from 0700 to 2200), and had concerns about the responsiveness of emergency vehicles, and arriving near their maximum landing weight with their fuel load, but with a perfectly good aircraft they were not having any problems handling, they may have decided it was safer to go somewhere and circle around, wait for daylight, burn off some fuel, and then return to Kuala Lumpur for a daylight visual approach and landing.
More assumptions:
And now the biggest concern is one of avoiding a mid-air collision as the airways over the Strait of Malacca are extremely busy, and no one knows they are there, so they follow westbound aircraft to get away from the busy flight corridors in the Strait of Malacca, and transition between non-cardinal flight levels which they feel are the safest to avoid other traffic.
At 0222, the last primary radar track places MH370 at approximately 6.5N 96.5E having flown 765 nm in 1 hour 40 minutes, a reasonable average speed of 460 knots.
Given the track and time from Pulau Perak, the estimated course at 0222 is 296° true and the estimated groundspeed is 476 knots (M0.80) with a light wind from the northeast. Although BFO calculations are quite insensitive to aircraft altitude, an altitude of 28,500 feet was assumed and used in the model; a non-cardinal altitude safely under FL290.
0222 MYT to 0240 MYT
More assumptions:
Having decided to fly on and get out of congested traffic areas and circle until daylight, it would be reasonable to assume the flight crew would attempt to restore power to some of the aircraft and cabin systems, possibly by entering the E&E bay (the Electronics and Equipment compartment) and selectively restoring power to systems. It would appear that power was restored to the SDU (Satellite Data Unit) around 0223 causing an aircraft initiated logon at 02:25:27.
There is no reason assume anything but a continuation of the flight path heading 296° and groundspeed 476 knots through this period. The BFO calculations at 0225 (1825 UTC) and 0228 confirm this heading and speed.
Calculated BFO @ 18:25:27 (0225 MYT) 6.742N 96.119E: 142.51 (measured BFO: 142)
Calculated BFO @ 18:28:15 (2:28MYT) 6.904N 95.787E: 143.65 (measured BFO: 143)
The BFO anomaly at 18:27:08 (BFO=172) can be accounted for by assuming the aircraft was climbing (BFO calculated at VSI 1250fpm = 172.00) in preparation for a turn south.
A turn to the southwest had to occur some time between 2:29 and 2:39 as at 2:40 there was another communication with the satellite with recorded BFO values of 88 and 90 which indicates the aircraft was going in a southerly direction by that time.
The turn southwest at 02:38 to a heading of 205° to get away from the busy traffic areas is consistent with the flight crew keeping their course changes very simple, ie. a 90° turn. The timing and direction of the turn is not arbitrary – this is a retrofit calculated by the computer model to subsequently place the aircraft at the right time and place later on. A ground track of 206° is assumed to account for a slight wind drift.
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Malaysian Airlines flight MH370
Scheduled flight from Kuala Lumpur Malaysia (KUL WMKK Sepang) to Beijing China (PEK ZBAA Chaoyang). Departure 0040 March 8, 2014, flight time 5 1⁄2 hours.
227 passengers and 12 crew.
Pilot: Captain Zaharie Ahmad Shaw (53, 18,365 hours flight time)
First Officer: Fariq Abdul Hamid (27, 2,763 hours flight time)
Boeing B777-2H6ER registry 9M-MRO with 2 Rolls Royce Trent 892B17 engines.
Weight empty: 304,500 lbs
Passengers/Crew/Baggage: 47,800 lbs (est)
Cargo: 8,000 lbs (est)
Fuel: 108,250 lbs
Weight @ takeoff: 468,550 lbs (MLW maximum landing weight: 470,000 lbs)
Note: Endurance @ M0.83 FL350: 7h26m 3347nm (ie. fuel starvation approximately 8.08am MYT)
Note: The cargo included 5,300 lbs of lithium batteries and associated equipment.
Scenario
This describes a possible scenario that takes place aboard MH370 as a mechanism used to describe all of the assumptions and data used in the computer model, presented as a timeline from 12am MYT (1600 UTC) March 8, 2014 to 8.19am MYT. I reiterate that this is my interpretation and guesswork based on limited publicly available information and speculation and is by no means meant to represent what actually happened on this flight.
0000 MYT
Aircraft systems are powered up by the flight crew and/or ground support personnel. This initiates the first power-on sequence with the Inmarsat-3 F1 satellite and ground station in Perth Australia. From the Inmarsat data logs:
Legend:
INX: the index reference used in the computer model
R: reference information – not used in the computer model
F: fixed waypoint – fixed time & fixed location
V: variable waypoint – fixed time but unknown location
T: heading change – time, position, heading determined by the computer
Raduis is the “ring radius” in great circle nautical miles from the satellite footprint (latitude longitude) at that time, based on the conical satellite angle derived from the BTO (Burst Timing Offset) value per the formula described in the ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Bureau) report AE-2014-054.
BFOs (Burst Frequency Offsets) calculations are complex and involve determination of satellite and aircraft movements and the resulting line-of-sight vector velocities which cause a Doppler shift in the uplink and downlink carrier frequencies, as well as some interesting frequency shift compensation carried out by the aircraft and ground stations.
The first few waypoints (index reference) were used to confirm the model algorithms.
KUL Gate C1 2.748N 101.712E Runway 32R “hold short” 2.748N 101.722E
Inmarsat-3 F1 position/footprint at 16:00 0.960N 64.555E
Actual distance satellite footprint to KUL gate C1: 2231 nm
Calculated distance from BTO value by the computer model: 2233.3 nm
Recorded BFO: 85
Calculated BFO: 84.61
0028 MYT
MH370 requests push back and engine start at gate C1 KUL Kuala Lumpur.
0041 MYT
MH370 cleared for takeoff runway 32R. Liftoff at 00:41:43.
00:42:10 Cleared to FL180 direct to waypoint Igari.
0056 MYT
Acars data sent. Flightradar24 reports FL282 heading 25° speed 460 knots.
0107 MYT
MH370 confirms at FL350. ACARS data sent indicating location (5.27N 102.79E) altitude: FL350, heading: 25° speed: 468 knots, fuel: 43,800kg (96,562 lbs).
Calculated distance from BTO value: 2305.6nm
Actual distance satellite footprint to known aircraft position: 2303nm
Calculated BFO: 132.66
Measured BFO: 132
0119 MYT
MH370 handed off to Ho Chi Minh ATC. MH370 confirms “Good night Malaysian 370”.
0121 MYT
Flightradar24 reports FL350 heading 40° speed 471 knots at waypoint Igari located at 6.948N 103.577E.
At 01:21:13 the radar label for MH370 disappears from the radar screen at Kuala Lumpur Radar in the Kuala Lumpur Air Traffic Control Centre. This is indicative of loss of an aircraft transponder signal. |
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Event
At this point something happened to MH370. We may not ever know exactly what. And here the speculation begins: and your assumptions depend on what you believe happened.
The following assumptions are mine (although many others share the same assumptions) and are presented here only to explain the reasoning built into the computer flight model.
The key assumption is there was a serious, but not catastrophic, problem with the aircraft systems and/or cargo and that the flight crew were doing their best, based on their training and extensive experience, to handle the emergency and provide for the safety of the passengers, crew, and aircraft.
But unfortunately something did go wrong. It seems unlikely that the aircraft suffered a catastrophic event at this point such as a fire, engine explosion, or explosive/rapid cabin decompression – in any of these situations the flight crew would have landed at the nearest suitable airport and would not prolong the flight.
The assumption here is that a serious, but not life threatening, electrical problem occurred (perhaps due to a problem in the forward cargo hold, or a electrical component/generator failed with cascading effects which tripped multiple breakers) and/or the flight crew were presented with multiple warnings and disconnected generators and bus ties in fear of having a potential disastrous electrical fire.
The B777 has a very sophisticated electrical system with multiple levels of backup, so it is highly unlikely that they “lost power”. As a result of this event all radio equipment, including the transponder, appear to have been permanently disabled. Power to the satellite communications equipment was temporarily lost at this point or shortly thereafter.
Presumably with the autopilot disconnected and flying on standby instruments, they concentrated on getting the aircraft manually stabilised and then turned southwest heading back towards Malaysia and appeared to head towards the nearest airport with a long runway, namely the Penang International Airport with a 3,480m (11,410ft) runway.
0128 MYT to 0222 MYT
Between 0128 and 0222 an aircraft believed to be MH370 was tracked by military primary radar which does not depend on an aircraft’s transponder signals.
By 0152 the aircraft was approaching Penang International and had descended to a lower altitude just south of the airport.
Assumptions:
With no radio communication and possibly no navigation radios, the flight crew may have tried to contact the Penang Airport by using a cell phone. If they could not notify airport personnel of their approach (primary operating hours at Penang are from 0700 to 2200), and had concerns about the responsiveness of emergency vehicles, and arriving near their maximum landing weight with their fuel load, but with a perfectly good aircraft they were not having any problems handling, they may have decided it was safer to go somewhere and circle around, wait for daylight, burn off some fuel, and then return to Kuala Lumpur for a daylight visual approach and landing.
More assumptions:
And now the biggest concern is one of avoiding a mid-air collision as the airways over the Strait of Malacca are extremely busy, and no one knows they are there, so they follow westbound aircraft to get away from the busy flight corridors in the Strait of Malacca, and transition between non-cardinal flight levels which they feel are the safest to avoid other traffic.
At 0222, the last primary radar track places MH370 at approximately 6.5N 96.5E having flown 765 nm in 1 hour 40 minutes, a reasonable average speed of 460 knots.
Given the track and time from Pulau Perak, the estimated course at 0222 is 296° true and the estimated groundspeed is 476 knots (M0.80) with a light wind from the northeast. Although BFO calculations are quite insensitive to aircraft altitude, an altitude of 28,500 feet was assumed and used in the model; a non-cardinal altitude safely under FL290.
0222 MYT to 0240 MYT
More assumptions:
Having decided to fly on and get out of congested traffic areas and circle until daylight, it would be reasonable to assume the flight crew would attempt to restore power to some of the aircraft and cabin systems, possibly by entering the E&E bay (the Electronics and Equipment compartment) and selectively restoring power to systems. It would appear that power was restored to the SDU (Satellite Data Unit) around 0223 causing an aircraft initiated logon at 02:25:27.
There is no reason assume anything but a continuation of the flight path heading 296° and groundspeed 476 knots through this period. The BFO calculations at 0225 (1825 UTC) and 0228 confirm this heading and speed.
Calculated BFO @ 18:25:27 (0225 MYT) 6.742N 96.119E: 142.51 (measured BFO: 142)
Calculated BFO @ 18:28:15 (2:28MYT) 6.904N 95.787E: 143.65 (measured BFO: 143)
The BFO anomaly at 18:27:08 (BFO=172) can be accounted for by assuming the aircraft was climbing (BFO calculated at VSI 1250fpm = 172.00) in preparation for a turn south.
A turn to the southwest had to occur some time between 2:29 and 2:39 as at 2:40 there was another communication with the satellite with recorded BFO values of 88 and 90 which indicates the aircraft was going in a southerly direction by that time.
The turn southwest at 02:38 to a heading of 205° to get away from the busy traffic areas is consistent with the flight crew keeping their course changes very simple, ie. a 90° turn. The timing and direction of the turn is not arbitrary – this is a retrofit calculated by the computer model to subsequently place the aircraft at the right time and place later on. A ground track of 206° is assumed to account for a slight wind drift.
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0240 MYT and beyond
At 18:39:55 and 18:40:56 an attempted Air Telephony call recorded BFO values which indicate a southwesterly flight path. Unfortunately these do not record a BTO ring value.
Numerous other scenarios and tracks and starting points were examined, test flown in a B777-200ER flight simulator, and run through the computer flight model. None yielded a better starting point than the C channel test waypoint described above at 02:40:56 at 7.186N 94.436E with the aircraft on a 206° track and a groundspeed of 475 knots. It is just coincidental that this location is near waypoint Anoko – not planned in the analysis.
The calculated BFO value at 18:40 of 91.7 differs slightly from the recorded value of 90 but is well within the bounds described in the BTO BFO analysis section of the report.
0341 MYT
The next two recorded events are the logon acknowledgement “pings” at 0341 and 0441.
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More assumptions:
The assumption is that having gotten “off the beaten track” to avoid other aircraft the flight crew would have gone into a simple holding pattern for a couple of hours waiting for daylight before returning to Kuala Lumpur. Many alternatives were examined – the only one which places the aircraft at the right time and place, and is consistent with what an experienced flight crew might have done, is described below. A straightforward holding pattern followed by a run down the west coast of Sumatra, keeping the shore line lights in sight, followed by an turn to the east, returning to KUL at first light (which was at approximately 0650 MYT on March 8, 2014).
The racetrack holding pattern depicted above consists of flying for 20 minutes on the southwesterly 205° heading, followed by a 180° 4 minute turn (which takes 2 minutes), another 20 minutes on the reciprocal course of 025°, etc.
This racetrack holding pattern is “anchored” on waypoint Anoko – this was not by design in the computer model – it just happened, but perhaps by intent by an experienced flight crew to retain a fixed navigation reference point.
This holding pattern places the aircraft at the right place at the right time to respond to the 19:41 (0341 MYT) and 20:41 (0441 MYT) satellite Logon Interrogation “pings”.
Recorded BFO at 19:41 (03:41MYT): 111
Calculated BFO track 206° at 475 knots at the crossing latitude and longitude: 111.09
0441 MYT
Arriving at the correct BFO value for the 2041 crossing takes a bit more rationalisation, assumptions, and explanations, as the aircraft is at the right place and the right time but going the wrong way!
More assumptions:
At 0440 the pilot throttles back and starts a rapid descent from 28500 in the holding pattern to much lower altitude (estimated 17500 or 11500 for the computer model) in preparation for the run down the west coast of Sumatra.
For this flight track the BFO value suggests a rapid descent from 28550 as shown below:
Recorded BFO at 20:41 (04:41MYT): 141
Calculated BFO track 25° at 470 knots VS= 0 (level flight): 217.8
Calculated BFO track 25° at 470 knots VS= -2000fpm: 169.5
Calculated BFO track 25° at 470 knots VS= -3180fpm: 141.0
The flight crew, still concerned with mid-air collisions, may have executed a rapid descent through standard mid-level altitudes to a lower non-cardinal altitude for the run down the west coast of Sumatra. An altitude of 17,500 ft, just below the FL180 controlled airspace, was used in the flight path model.
Another possible explanation is a secondary event at this point which may have triggered a new set of warnings, possibly of rapid cabin depressurisation, cargo hold smoke or fire, etc which precipitated a rapid descent, a slower speed at a lower altitude, and a decision to immediately proceed towards the nearest large airport, which at this point is Kuala Lumpur International.
0457 MYT
There is a possibility of a sighting of MH370 at approximately 0500 MYT from a sailboat off the north coast of Sumatra. Katherine Tee on the early morning watch on the sailboat SV Aaza Dana reported seeing an aircraft at a lower than normal altitude which crossed their stern going from north to south. Some quotes from her Internet blog:
“I was sitting facing the port side when I saw an orange speck at the 8 o’clock position relative to the boat. When it moved to the 7 o’clock position identified as a plane with an orange glow. It disappeared towards our 5 o’clock position 5 to 10 minutes later, having crossed our stern heading north to south. I did not hear any sounds as our engine was running at the time.”
Excerpts from the boat’s GPS navigation logs. The log time is derived from GPS satellite data and is most probably relative to UTC+6 as that is the geographical time zone that the sailboat was in at that time; thus 0200 log time is 0400 MYT (which is UTC+8 based).
If the modelled flight path is correct the aircraft would have been at the 8 o’clock position at 0457 with a nearest approach of approximately 15 nautical miles (possibly closer) and would have disappeared six minutes later at the 5 o’clock position at 0503 MYT.
Author’s speculation: the “orange speck/glow” might result from a reflection from the fuselage if the B777 landing lights located in the wings were on at the time, given the flight crews concern about possible mid-air collisions as no one knew where they were.
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0501 MYT to 0541 MYT
There are actually very few flight tracks that take the aircraft from somewhere on the holding pattern to an 0541 ring crossing with the correct BTO BFO values while maintaining flight envelope speed ranges for this aircraft at a lower altitude. At each point and ring crossing the computer model reports a number of flight tracks that meet the time, distance, speed, heading, BTO and BFO constraints. The computer model followed each of these tracks through subsequent possible turns and ring crossings but the majority do not meet the time, distance, speed, heading, BTO and BFO constraints.
The best fit modelled results indicate a turn to the southeast at 05:01:40 at 6.26N 94.00E with a groundspeed of 430 knots, turning to a heading of approximately 141° and slowing to a speed of 416 knots by 0541 MYT.
By 0641 MYT the aircraft is heading east, slowing appreciably, possibly waiting for daylight and/or in preparation for a landing approach.
Recorded BFO at 21:41 (05:41MYT): 168
Calculated BFO track 141° at 416 knots: 168.08
Recorded BFO at 22:41 (06:41MYT): 204
Calculated BFO track 100° at 247 knots: 204.25
It appears that the flight crew may have been navigating to standard waypoints as one of the possible tracks in each set in this timeframe intersects a waypoint (Merim Dosik).
It is interesting to note that by 0541 MYT, at higher latitudes (which has an effect on BFO calculations) and with the Inmarsat-3 satellite now moving in a southerly direction, recorded BFO values are indicative of a flight path heading east. This was as much of a surprise to the author as it might be to everyone else, and assumes that the analysis and interpretation of the Inmarsat data in this report is somewhat accurate, which may not be the case given the complexity of such an analysis and the limited amount of information publicly available.
0641 MYT to 0715 MYT
Flight path prediction between 0641 and 0715 and beyond to 0811 is very complex and subjective in this scenario because there are so many possibilities and very little data.
A number of possibilities are discussed in this section, all very speculative. Better answers await the recovery of the aircraft and cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, which unfortunately may or may not provide much additional information.
At 23:14:01 and 23:15:02 an attempted air telephony call recorded BFO values which indicate a northeasterly flight path. Unfortunately these do not record a BTO ring value.
# An approximate BTO value and “ring radius” can be estimated and interpolated by time differential between the o641 and the 0811 rings. This places a “virtual 0715 ring” very close to the eastern shore of the Malaysian peninsula, which helps to establish probable flight directions from the 0641 ring to 0715, and beyond to the 0811 ring.
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The following map shows a likely flight path if the intention was to land at first daylight at Kuala Lumpur International. The track indicates a small turn shortly after 0641 MYT towards the waypoint Batar, with the intention of turning left to a heading of 326° at this waypoint, which would put them into the landing pattern for runway 32L.
Unfortunately something seems to have gone wrong in this timeframe in this scenario which caused the aircraft to continue on past this waypoint. Potentially, loss of flight controls or with the flight crew overcome by toxic fumes or oxygen deprivation, the autopilot carried on in a northeasterly direction until the aircraft ran out of fuel.
Recorded BFO values at 23:15 (07:15 MYT): 216 and 219
Calculated BFO track 78° at 23:14 at 340 knots: 216.57
Calculated BFO track 68° at 23:15 at 340 knots: 219.55
A speed and distance analysis indicates some possible flight paths (out of hundreds of possibilities analysed in the computer model) towards the 0811 ring.
A constant heading track of 78° beyond the 7:15 “virtual” ring requires a decrease in groundspeed to 286 knots – this is not deemed to be a high probability track.
The average speed to cover the distance between the 0641 ring and the 0715 “virtual” ring on a heading of 78° is 294 knots. A heading of 68° at a continued groundspeed of 294 knots does indeed take the aircraft to the 0811 ring at the correct time. This track is labeled “294 kts” on the map.
However, the groundspeed at 0641 was estimated to be 247 knots. To achieve an average speed of 294 knots, the “exit” speed at 0715 must have climbed to 340 knots, thus the calculated BFO values shown above for the 0715 “virtual” ring crossing. The outbound 340 knot track assumes a continued left turn to a heading of 50° to reach the 0811 ring at the correct time from this point.
Similarly, if the aircraft was actually slowing down as it approached waypoint Batar in preparation for landing, a subsequent acceleration to 420 knots would be required to achieve an average speed of 294 knots on this leg. A subsequent left turn to a heading of 35° would be required to reach the 0811 ring at the correct time at this speed.
0811 MYT to 0819 MYT and beyond
The next two recorded events are the logon acknowledgement “ping” at 0811 and the aircraft initiated logon at 0819, which is presumed to be an SDU (Satellite Data Unit) power-up around 0817, following a RAT (Ram Air Turbine) automatic deployment (which supplies emergency hydraulic and electrical power) after a final engine flameout due to fuel exhaustion at approximately 0815.
Recorded BFO values at 00:11 (08:11 MYT): 252
Calculated BFO track 35° at 420 knots level flight: 224.62
Calculated BFO track 35° at 420 knots VS +1400 fpm: 252.79
Recorded BFO values at 00:19 (08:19 MYT): 182
Calculated BFO track 35° at 330 knots level flight: 222.11
Calculated BFO track 35° at 330 knots VS -1950 fpm: 182.24
The calculated BFO at 0819 indicates the aircraft is descending at 1,950 feet per minute which is within expected limits as a glideslope with no engine power and a lighter aircraft with empty fuel tanks. The speed of 330 knots at 0819 is based on entry:average:exit speed calculations for this leg of the flight path.
However, the calculated BFO at 0811 is quite baffling – this would indicate the aircraft is climbing at 1,400 feet per minute. The only explanation that comes to mind is an earlier flame-out of one engine, causing an electrical system disruption, which in turn causes an autopilot disconnect, and with a lighter aircraft in a nose-up trim position, the aircraft climbs for a short period of time.
If these flight profile numbers are correct, we can derive some interesting calculations.
If the AES logon sequence at 18:25:27 is representative we would have expected a User Data transmission by 00:21:14 following the 00:19:29 AES logon. One explanation is that the aircraft was no longer airborne beyond 00:21:11, a flight time of 2 minutes following the last 0019 communication. If this is the case, the aircraft would be within 10 to 12 nautical miles of the last recorded position at 00:19:37.
If the aircraft was at a higher altitude at 0819 and there is another explanation for the lack of any further satellite communication, a reasonable glideslope could have taken the aircraft another 50 nautical miles, most likely in a slow spiral in one direction or another.
Why or when the flight crew, or most likely the autopilot, decided to turn northeast is not clear. If the autopilot flew past the last intermediate waypoint, it might have reverted to a “final destination” heading towards Beijing.
One of the most probable flight tracks beyond the 0715 “virtual ring” at a groundspeed of 420 knots on a heading of 35° is shown below labelled “420 kts” terminating at 0819 at N8.60 E107.96 having flown 3,135 nm from takeoff at Kuala Lumpur International.
The map indicates the end-of-track locations and the possible final locations of flight MH370 (yellow) and the most probable location (green circle) centred at N8.80 E108.08. |
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0815 MYT (0715 Vietnam time zone)
The 420 knot 35° track is particularly interesting because it supports an “aircraft in distress” sighting and report by Mike McKay on the oil rig Songa-Mercur off the coast of Vietnam on the morning of March 8, 2014. His e-mail message is copied below:
This small portion of the map shows the location of the oil rig, the estimated bearings and distance to the “Malaysian Airlines plane” and the location of the Inmarsat last ping ring (which had not been made public at the time of this sighting) with the termination of the 420 knot 35° track. It is hard to believe this is just a mere coincidence or fabrication.
Conclusions
If the aircraft is not found in the present search area in the Southern Indian Ocean (no sign of any wreckage as of October 2014) then perhaps this report can help the authorities re-evaluate the Inmarsat recorded data in a new light to define further search areas.
If indeed this does represent the flight path and final location of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 then it does explain why no wreckage or debris has ever been found in the search areas thousands of miles away. It does however paint a tragic “so near yet so far” ending to a desperate situation in which everyone involved was doing their professional best.
Once again, the scenario presented here is only meant to help explain the assumptions that were used in the model and analysis, and reflects one interpretation based on limited publicly available information and speculation and is by no means meant to represent what actually happened on this flight – that is up to the Accident Investigation authorities.
Why was this aircraft not tracked by radar? It would not have registered on ATC Secondary Radar if the transponders were still malfunctioning, but may very well have been picked up by Military Primary Radar. However it would not have drawn undue attention as it would have appeared as just another commercial airliner on a flight path to or from Kuala Lumpur International. If the radar tapes from March 8, 2014 are still available, that would be a good starting point to help confirm or repudiate this scenario.
This report was sent to the Malaysian Ministry of Transport, Malaysian Airlines, and to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau on November 2, 2014.
One way or another, my hope is that one day the final resting place of 9M-MRO MH370 is found to answer numerous questions for the sake of the families of the passengers and crew, and to discover the true cause of this tragic incident. – November 17, 2014.
* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insider.
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motip mcm tesis??  |
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selagi umur panjang kes MH370 ni akan terus diikuti
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kemana dan dimana agak nya mh 370 tu ye..pesawat yg begitu gedebak hilang tampa kesan.. |
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korang komen ne, korang baca ke?
mau tak panjang.. artikel sket jah, copy paste ulang kali..  |
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Mula-mula gigih lagi baca sampai #6 terus scroll x baca baca dah |
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Post time 18-11-2014 05:17 PM
变色卡
Author
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